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RESEARCHING SOCIAL ANALYTICS: CULTURAL SOCIOLOGY IN THE FACE 
OF ALGORITHMIC POWER 
 
Nick Couldry, London School of Economics and Political Science 
Chapter in M. Savage and L. Hanquinet Handbook of Sociology of Culture and Art 
(Routledge 2015). 
 
A new topic of research is opening up for cultural sociology: social actors’ everyday use and 
reflections on ‘analytics’, that is, any digital tools that measure them and their presence in a 
world of online presences. I call this study ‘social analytics’. This topic emerges at a moment 
when the longer histories of science and technology studies (STS) and phenomenology are 
intersecting in interesting ways in the digital age. Paradoxically some leading sociologists of 
culture fear that reflexive agency is no longer there to be studied, crushed out of existence by 
the all-encompassing force of ‘algorithmic power’ (Lash 2007). This premature fear of 
something like ‘the end of cultural sociology’ ignores the phenomenological richness of 
everyday struggles with and through the countless tools for measuring our digital presences 
whose operations are now deeply embedded in routine action. It also turns its back on the 
contemporary potential for a ‘sociology of social critique’ focussed on the arbitrary 
operations of the institutional processes that shape and order our constructions of social 
reality (Boltanski 2010). This chapter, and the project it outlines, aims to reclaim that 
potential in a distinctive way. 
 
Social analytics, as outlined here, defends, albeit in new form, a phenomenologically-
influenced sociology of culture that is interested less in the reproduction of ‘society’ or in the 
measurement of society’s macro-variables, and more in the changing material conditions for 
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the presentation of the self: the ‘self’ not just of individuals, but also of groups and 
organizations.1 As such, it is less interested in the complexity of digital ‘objects’ (an 
important topic, however, for cultural sociology in its own right: see MacKenzie et al., this 
volume), than in the richness of social actors’ reflexive interactions with those objects, and 
particularly with the interfaces for interaction and digital presence built from those objects.   
 
These recent topics for cultural sociology can be seen against a much longer and more partial 
history of incorporating media and communications infrastructures into sociology. The 
institutionally directed circulation of media products has been a routine feature of everyday 
life in rich countries for nearly two centuries. We know something about traditional media’s 
broader consequences for the presentation of the self as originally conceived by Goffman 
(Meyrowitz 1985 on Goffman 1961), but less about its details. Indeed, in spite of the separate 
development of media and communications studies as a discipline, or interdisciplinary space, 
over the past 30 years, there has remained a lack of attention, even in specialist work on 
media consumption, to the variety of things people do with media. We have known for three 
decades that people interpret media texts in different ways (Morley and Brunsdon  1980; Ang 
1986), but ‘audience studies’ became increasingly uncertain that it could map the diversity of 
things people do with media (Alasuutaari 1997), concentrating often on the most engaged 
members of the media audience. Meanwhile, people’s individual trajectories through the rich 
and vast textual space of contemporary media remains surprisingly underexplored (see 
Couldry 2000: chapter 3).  It has been in relation to taste, and mainly in France, where this 
problem has been best addressed: there, in explicit disagreement with Pierre Bourdieu’s 
large-scale theory of the reproduction of class through taste, Bernard Lahire insisted on the 
complexity of individual consumption practice and the inability of general models to capture 




The wider problem is how, in a sociology serious about addressing the ‘complexity’ of 
contemporary culture (Hannerz 1992), we can be adequate both to the open-ended diversity 
of individual adaptations of the cultural stuff around them and to the continuous work of 
power through such diversity. While Pierre Bourdieu’s insight into the ‘de facto division of 
labour of social production with regard to major varieties of experience’ (Bourdieu 1992: 
118) remains fundamental, the modes of ‘social production’ are changing radically, requiring 
attention to various forms of institutionalised symbolic violence (Boltanski 2010), not least 
how  in a digital age social being is measured for competing institutional ends.  In the digital 
world, where (at least in the global North) internet access is available to most people most of 
the time, the ‘textualization’ of the world is taken to a more intense level, so the uncertainties 
about what people do with such textual excess are multiplied. A version of the same problem 
matters hugely to cultural producers too, since they no longer can be sure of reaching 
audiences most effectively through general modes of address (the mass advertisement). The 
resulting turn within advertising culture (Turow 2007; 2011) towards niche marketing and 
data-driven tracking of individuals (uniquely specified, even if their name has been stripped 
away) addresses this problem, but at a high social cost: the embedding of continuous 
surveillance and algorithmically-based data collection into the consumption process. 
Whenever we go online, we are lured into this surveillance space where it is the aim of the 
software designers who shape our micro-access to the web to ‘turn every customer touch 
point  . . . into a point of sale’ (quoted Turow 2007: 123). The infrastructure to deliver this 
new form of micro-advertising is based on algorithms: automated processes of counting, 
tracking and aggregating data and metadata. But measurement also takes broader forms in 
digital culture, one of which (via the use of analytics) is potentially open to intervention by 
social actors without special expertise, via actions at the ‘front-end’ of websites. It is this 
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everyday embedding of algorithms in the stuff of culture (a deep textualization which often 
involves a codification) that generates the new opportunities for a sociology of culture which 
are this chapter’s main focus.  
 
Sociology of culture has always had to address the force of measurements of cultural 
performance. But the conflict that arises from today’s embedding of measurement into the 
very texture of everyday experience is real, not trivial. Jose Van Dijck sums it up well when 
she writes: ‘content and content management have become virtual synonyms in the 
ecosystem of connective media. Even when the aim of platforms is not to exploit content for 
monetary gain, as in the case of Wikipedia, content can only be made functional or valuable 
if it is managed through systems operating on the dual premise of “authentic” yet 
manipulated processing’ (Van Dijck 2013: 162, added emphasis). Cultural sociology’s task is 
to think and research beyond this conflict, registering how it is worked through in the 
everyday life of social actors. It can without doubt be argued that the automated 
measurements explicitly linked to social media platforms directly reproduce neoliberal norms 
of competitive subjectivity, in a replay of ealier Foucauldian arguments about disciplinary 
modernity (eg Marwick 2013). But a richer sociology of culture will want to go beyond such 
reproductive models to consider how social actors are reflecting on and/or contesting their 
relations to the measurement now routinized in our everyday use of platforms for the digital 
presentation of the self. I will explore this latter approach, first, from the perspective of 
theoretical debates about the consequences of algorithmic power, approaching the empirical 







Sociology of Culture and the Problem with Algorithmic Power 
No one would disagree that algorithmic processes are now increasingly salient in the texture 
of everyday life (Halavais 2008, Lash 2007, Burrows 2009, Gillespie 2014). Some writers go 
further and argue that the deep embedding of algorithmic technology within everyday 
phenomena creates ‘a collapse of ontology and epistemology’ (Lash 2006: 581), installing a 
power-laden regime of ‘facticity’ (Lash 2007: 56) in which ‘there is no time, nor space . . . 
for reflection’ (Lash 2002: 18). If Lash is right, why pay close attention any more to what 
actors say when they ‘reflect’ on their position in the social world? But accepting Lash’s line 
of argument means ignoring a key site of tension in a digital age when social actors are 
struggling to make effective use of analytics in particular social contexts. Such struggles are 
part of a much larger history of institutional symbolic violence (Bourdieu 1990), but we need 
to follow such struggles in their contemporary digital forms or miss an opportunity to build a 
richer sociological critique of the digital age.  
 
If an earlier phenomenology advanced by grasping how ‘we derive our sense of self from the 
image of our self that others reflect back to us in interaction’ (Crossley 2001: 143, 
summarising Cooley 1902), a contemporary phenomenology must explore how today’s social 
actors interact with the algorithmically generated versions of themselves that derive from the 
internet’s embedding in everyday life. Such a social analytics may also contribute to the 
wider and growing field of ‘digital sociology’ (Marres 2012; MacKenzie et al. this volume), 
although  this is not a focus of this chapter. 
 
There is no doubt of the sociological importance today of how ‘categorization’ seen as a key 
process in the constitution of social order since Durkheim (Durkheim and Mauss 1960; 
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Bowker and Star 2000) -  has become automated and, as such, central to all consumption and 
information seeking online, as well as many aspects of government (Amoore 2011). 
‘Categorization’ is no longer just something social individuals do within an open process of 
socialization: it is something done consistently to them and their actions. Yet it occurs not 
openly, but in the background, shaping (through advertisers’ and sales entities’ automated 
systems) what we can buy and at what price (Turow 2007), configuring (through the 
operations of their internal algorithms) what standard search engines reveal to us when we 
look for basic information (Paliser 2011), and shaping (through the operation of web 
analytics) how an organization appears in the world to the constituency of people who 
interact with it (funders, investors, supporters). Algorithms or, more broadly, the use of 
analytics in everyday life, shape fields of action in advance by shaping how things, people 
and organizations get counted, presented and seen. That is beyond doubt. 
 
Lash however argues this form of algorithmic power, because based in the pre-arrangement 
of life’s informational infrastructure (2007: 56), shifts the nature of power from a ‘hegemony’ 
that works externally on subjects through their minds to a generative ‘force’ that works 
within subjects and objects (2007: 56), a shift from ‘normativity’ to ‘facticity’, 
‘epistemology’ to ‘ontology’. A problem with Lash’s dramatic account is that power based on 
norms, epistemology and authority has always also been condensed into reified forms that 
support such power. The idea that power has suddenly shifted its very nature to be more 
‘ontological’ underestimates both the consistent role of reification (Honneth 2012) 
throughout history and people’s opportunities from time to time to bring power’s workings, 
however reified, to the surface, confronting ontological ‘fact’ with epistemological challenge. 
For sure, the workings of algorithmic power pose many challenges as its analysts note, not 
least through the hidden and highly technical nature of many of its operations (Halavais 2008, 
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Gillespie 2014), but popular contestation, although it has taken a long time to emerge, is now 
emerging, and is far from trivial as a cultural process. A longer tradition of power analysis 
has always taken seriously the difficulty of challenging long-established power-blocs that rely 
on well-established symbols and, in the media age, on intense monopolies of symbolic power. 
Think of Alberto Melucci’s (1996) work on ‘symbolic power’, resistance and ‘naming’ with 
its roots in Paolo Freire’s conscientization theory which had proclaimed the importance of 
renaming the world, not just challenging the details of its explicit knowledge (Freire 1982). 
But Lash’s generalized philosophical commentary misses these longer-term historical 
resonances of current battles over algorithmic power.  
 
The historic shift Lash rightly registers is that ‘power through naming’ (or what we might call 
‘deep’ categorization) is now embedded in a many-levelled technologically-established 
interface of unprecedented complexity that is not just generally opaque but technically very 
difficult to unbundle, let alone reverse. Recently US legal theorist Julie Cohen has captured 
this well when she writes that ‘the configuration of networked space is increasingly opaque to 
its users’ (2012: 202) and that its web of protocols, data requirements and data monitoring 
has created a ‘system of governance that is authoritarian’ because it is so difficult to 
challenge (2012: 188-189). This is a very important point, but it is not the same as saying that 
such power cannot in principle be challenged. Indeed Cohen’s writing is just one element in a 
slowly building wave of challenge to the ‘facticity’ of the digital infrastructure: other 
examples come from information science (Mejias 2013), cultural studies (Van Dijck 2013), 
popular commentary (Lanier 2013, Paliser 2011), and social psychology (Turkle 2011). All 




However, it is worth going back to one element of that debate Lash generated, namely David 
Beer’s (2009) commentary which insisted on the importance of some basic empirical 
questions about how algorithms are pervasively embedded in culture, that is, in the making of 
meaning and our experience of the world: questions concerning (1) ‘the organizations that 
establish and cultivate Web 2.0 applications’, (2) ‘the actual operations and functionality of 
the software packages that organise our web experience’, and (3) (most importantly for my 
argument here) how the outcomes of (1) and (2) ‘play out in the lives of those that use (or do 
not use) participatory web applications’ (Beer 2009: 998). We can broaden the implications 
of Beer’s argument beyond interfaces that are formally participatory. Beer is rightly 
interested in people’s ability to interact with the processes that are classifying them through 
what he calls a ‘classificatory imagination’ (2007: 998). Why not research the overall 
phenomenology of living reflexively in a world where algorithmic classification is embedded 
in multiple ways, even if often hidden from all but the most expert actor?  The object of 
‘social analytics’ research is to study how people act in, and in their everyday lives adapt to 
(Beer 2009: 997), this digitally-saturated, always-under-categorisation world.  
 
Tarleton Gillespie (2014) considers a complex form of reflexivity on the production side of 
algorithms: producers responsible for maintaining the public face of algorithm-driven 
platforms (like Twitter) must reflect constantly on the interplay between their ‘technical’ 
adjustments and the signals that their platform appears to send publicly to its users. Gillespie 
rightly insists that algorithms are not determining objects beyond human intervention; rather 
they are ‘both obscured and malleable’ (if they were wholly made public, the likelihood of 
people acting so to as manipulate their ‘performance’ would be too great). Gillespie is 
concerned with the role of algorithms on highly public platforms and interfaces such as 
Google and Twitter: such platforms he calls ‘public relevance algorithms’.  He insists that we 
9 
 
need a sociology both of such algorithms’ production and of how users react to, and act on 
the basis of, their background role. Such algorithms have broad consequences for the 
ontology of our public world. According to Gillespie, platform users strive to become 
‘algorithmically recognisable’, gaming the logics of search engines and algorithm-based 
platforms such as twitter (compare Beer 2009). That would certainly be part of ‘social 
analytics’, but a project of social analytics can look even more broadly at how actors draw on 
the basic workings of algorithms and analytics and seek to turn them consistently to their 
wider social ends. If so, social analytics can offer much more than an ‘audience studies’ of 
the digital world: it is concerned with the wider field of practice (Couldry 2012: chapter 2) 
focussed around the use and adaptation of algorithms and analytics, and all the further 
adjustments of action that flow from that.  This might involve, to take a simple example, 
using customised analytics (that use algorithms as their basic mechanism) to heighten the 
clarity and intensity with which a particular website foregrounds and links up debate on a 
particular theme that matters to an organization.  
 
In this sense, social analytics can contribute to our understanding of the ‘culture’ around 
analytics, and not  only the algorithms on which large-scale commercial platforms are based; 
social analytics can also study the counting mechanisms that are, in part, conceived and 
devised by social actors to meet ends much closer to home. This picks up on the dimension of 
social construction that the best sociologists of software and code have always recognised 
(MacKenzie 2006). As Adrian MacKenzie puts it, ‘code, the material that lies at the core of 
software, is unstable because it is both expression and action, neither of which are materially 
or socially stable’ (2006: 177). In other words, the production and use of algorithms is part of 





Such consequences therefore need to be traced through a sociology of action. If ‘taste 
classifies the classifier’ in Bourdieu’s famous phrase (Bourdieu 1984: 6), then the pervasive 
fact of background  algorithmic measurement ‘measures’ the social actor, grounding new 
hierarchies of visibility (Marwick 2013), but also providing sites where such hierarchies can 
be contested and renegotiated. Social analytics is concerned with how analytics shape, in part, 
the ways in which such an actor can present herself or itself as social, and so the changing 
ground-rules of actor’s social and cultural presence. Such shaping is open to reflexivity, at 
least under some conditions, just as is the face-to-face presentation of the self (Goffman 
1961). Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) have provided an important general framing of the 
new ‘spirit of capitalism’ in which individuals are inclined to compete in terms of their 
capacity as networked actors, and recent studies of practice around social networking sites 
show how this can be translated into forms of prestige based on connection and visibility 
(Banet-Weiser 2012; Marwick 2013). But there is considerably more scope for empirical 
research on how such technologically-extended processes allow also for reflexive agency. 
This is where the project of social analytics starts. The next section will explore in broad 
outline the possible topics for social analytics.  
 
Doing social analytics 
To appreciate this project’s scope, it is necessary first to define the core problem for social 
actors today for which social analytics, as it were, tries to listen out. Sociology of culture has 
always been concerned with how social hierarchies are maintained through cultural means 
(for example, in the mechanisms of taste), but in the digital era the problem is that agency – 
and particularly the presentation of self and identity - is now consistently mediated by 
calculative mechanisms of differentiation that are not open – or at least not initially or 
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obviously, open except to actors with considerable technological literacy -  to adjustment by 
actors themselves. The processes here are not analogous with how the physical infrastructure 
of an institutional setting mediates the presentation of self within that setting: notwithstanding 
some manifest inequalities of resource, such an infrastructure mediates the actions of all 
actors equally, even if their resources for acting within that setting may be unequal. That was 
the material context for the strategies and tactics for self-presentation in which Erving 
Goffman was interested.  But algorithms configure the stage of self-presentation in ways that, 
from the start, actively and cumulatively differentiate between actors: in that sense, the 
interface of analytics is itself an actor in the process of self-presentation, what Lash calls 
vividly ‘substance that thinks’ (2007:  70). Worse, the algorithmic interface is an actor whose 
operations are generally hidden from the actor that is trying to present her- or itself. Clearly, 
this opacity is an issue for any project of self-presentation, but only becomes an object of 
action and reflection to degrees that vary sharply, depending on the self-presenting actor and 
her or its circumstances and resources.  
 
The empirical work that social analytics involves thus can take many forms. I will discuss 
these in the following order: first, the tactics of individuals to resist what has been called the 
‘quantification of the self’ (Gerlitz and Helmond 20144l Lupton 2012); second, group tactics 
to ‘game’ the workings of particular algorithmic platforms; and third, the longer-term 
practices of organizations to use analytics of various sorts as part of developing who they are. 
I will spend more time on the third case since it is the least studied.  
 
Individual tactics 
Since Goffman, sociology has been interested in individuals’ practices for maintain a certain 
presentation of the self in everyday life. It has been clear for some time that the digital world 
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affords many new means for presenting the self: from diary or commentary blogs to social 
media platforms to microblogging platforms like twitter. Studying their use is an extension of 
the study of the face-to-face presentation of self (Livingstone 2008; boyd 2008). Such 
research only becomes ‘social analytics’ (in my sense) when part of the object on which 
individuals act and reflect becomes the mechanisms for counting and measuring the self’s 
presence online and its effects.  
 
As David Beer noted, it is of sociological interest to follow how individuals begin to follow 
the relationship between the information they provide to calculative mechanisms (explicit or 
hidden) starts to ‘impact  . . . on the constitution of their life-worlds’ (2009: 997) and, through 
this, begin, by modulating the information they themselves generate, to aim at having a 
different presentation of self through the algorithmic platform in question: ‘the right profile’ 
(2009: 997) for whatever algorithm they are interacting with. Some algorithmic platforms are 
relatively clear in their operations, for example the platform Last.fm which counts up what 
users listen to and plays this back to them in the form of an available playlist. But many other 
algorithmic interfaces are much less open to be read and influenced, yet they may be crucial 
either to the presentation of self or to a person’s interface with the world, for example their 
Facebook newsfeed.  
 
There is now a large literature on how people’s presentation of self and relationship to the 
everyday social world is being shaped by a reflexive relationship with the analytics that are 
embedded in everyday platforms of self-presentation. Gerlitz and Helmond (2014) examine 
the passage from a linking economy (connections between websites) to a Like economy, 
where users gain social currency from the public articulation of connections on social 
networking sites. In locations such online dating sites, for example, it is hardly surprising that 
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users often choose to state that they are younger than they really are (Ellison, Heino, and 
Gibbs, 2006). Meanwhile teenagers take measures to protect their privacy online by making 
content meaningful only to those they wish to (boyd 2014). As Knapp (forthcoming) points 
out, the largely occluded operations of the algorithms which shape individuals’ everyday 
interactional context constrains the degree of reflexivity possible, but certainly does not 
exclude it.  
 
To the extent that individuals’ aims (of self-promotion) are in tune with the explicit purpose 
of analytics-based platforms such as Twitter, there is no topic of social analytics, merely a 
conformity of actions to optimise the ‘status’ which those platforms precisely offer. Marwick 
(2013) argues exactly this for the uses of twitter by the technological elite in San Francisco 
involved in IT development. But social analytics emerge where individuals’ goals are more 
complex than simply promoting the self as a brand through analytics-based measures. At this 
point reflexivity comes into play as part of a more than purely instrumental approach to 
analytics and the platforms based upon them. Social analytics however emerges more clearly 
when we consider group and institutional actors, since there is no reason to assume that their 
goals can be reduced to fulfilling the expectations of visibility for its own sake, since those 
groups and institutions generally have more detailed reasons why they want to win visibility 
than just gaining higher visibility.   
 
Group Gaming 
Because social analytics is concerned with interactions with calculative mechanisms that 
require data volume, groups, especially large distributed groups, have a major tactical 
advantage over the individual, because they can generate considerably more information and 
events for counting. They are therefore more likely to be able to see ‘real time’ results from 
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their information inputs, and so start to ‘aim’ their further inputs accordingly. The result is 
what colloquially is called ‘gaming’ algorithmic interfaces, and this is one angle from which 
group actions can be of interest to social analytics.  
 
As algorithmically-based social media interfaces have started to become part of the assumed 
infrastructure of political and civic action, so sociologists and anthropologists have started to 
observe evidence of such ‘gaming’ as an explicit tactic by social movements concerned to 
influence the course of collective action through moment-to-moment coordination through 
such interfaces. In their study of a range of Twitter uses in political action, Segerberg and 
Bennett (2011: 213) note the importance of tracking the ‘user dynamics of hashtag use over 
time’, suggesting the possibility of such tactical (de Certeau 1984) interactions with the 
algorithms on which Twitter is based. Thomas Poell in his study of the use of Twitter by 
Toronto G20 protesters in 2010 (Poell 2013) notes the possible longer-term tension between 
Twitter’s  concern to foreground topics that are trending (that is, attracting the largest volume 
of attention) versus protesters’ interest in maintaining a fuller record of their collectively 
produced messages. Those first two studies study some effective preconditions for a social 
analytics study, but coordinated gaming of the twitter platform starts to emerge more 
explicitly in Youmans and York’s study of the Syrian Electronic Army, a group supporting 
the current Syrian regime which was determined to drown out the Syrian opposition’s  
messages on Twitter through the use of automated twitter accounts (Youmans and York 
2012).  
 
The anthropologist John Postill has observed the social use of analytics directly in the actions 
of the indignados (or 15M) movement in Barcelona, Spain that protested against government 
cuts and economic injustice in 2011 (Postill 2013). The use of Twitter in this movement 
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(including the linked platform Real Democracy Now – ‘DRY’, Democracía Real Ya) went 
beyond the basic use of the platform as a means of communication through appropriate 
hashtags, and so on. As Postill explains:  
 
A key part of DRY’s strategy prior to the demonstrations was to make the campaign a 
regular occurrence on Twitter’s “Trending topics”. Knowing that Twitter’s trending 
algorithm favours novelty over volume . . . they succeeded by frequently changing the 
campaign keywords and encouraging followers to retweet the newly agreed hashtag so 
that it would ‘trend’, thereby reaching a much wider audience.  
 
We can expect a huge variety of such ‘gaming’ practices to develop as familiarity with the 
logics of ‘public relevance platforms’ (Gillespie 2004) spreads. Some, as Postill notes, will 
depend on the particular literacy and foresight of an elite organizational group; other tactics 
will be more distributed, depending on the sheer volume of informational inputs that large 
numbers of informed participants can generate if at least minimally focussed on a particular 
end-result.  
 
The examples so far suggest that social analytics involves the technological mediation of 
group action without any tensions or contradictions. But as Veronica Barassi’s (Barassi 
forthcoming) work shows, a conflict may arise between the time needed to work on analytics 
(eg. the data-inputting necessary for influencing analytics or managing communications 
dependent on multiple digital platforms) and the time needed for the core activity of political 
action itself. Without wanting here to get into the specific dynamics of political action, this 
illustrates a broader point about the tensions inherent to using ‘measurement’ to achieve 
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broader social ends. We will consider this in more detail in the next subsection which focuses 
on the social use of analytics within organizations. 
 
Social Analytics on an Organizational Scale  
It was the use of measurement at an organizational level that first led to the idea of ‘social 
analytics’. I was leading a participatory action project concerned to research the digital 
platforms and social conditions which support narrative exchange for purposes of 
encouraging voice and mutual recognition. The strand in question involved a reporter 
network (let’s call them ‘C Media’) who trained community reporters and led a national 
network whose website presented the reports of those trained. Fieldwork within an action-
research paradigm was conducted by myself, Luke Dickens and Aristea Fotopoulou with C-
Media for a period of 15 months between early 2012 and mid-2013.2 When the fieldwork 
started, C Media’s website was not generating the traffic they wanted: C Media sensed it 
needed better metadata to present the themes of its reporters’ stories in a more effective way, 
but it did not know how to implement this. We quickly realised that, although our project was 
concerned with broader aims, to develop it in this strand there was no alternative but to 
become practically involved in acting and reflecting with C Media about how they used their 
website and its information architecture, to achieve their organizational purposes.  
 
While doing this fieldwork (see Couldry, Fotopoulou and Dickens forthcoming for more 
details of the stages of our fieldwork), we realized that, in carrying out such ‘technical’ work, 
we were doing something more, something of wider sociological interest. We were tracking 
how real actors used and reflected on analytics not for the sake of measurement itself (that 
emphatically was not C Media’s primary interest), but for the sake of meeting their broader 
social ends. We were tracking the process whereby a small civil society organization 
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translated its ends as a social actor into a certain use of technical tools, that is, analytics, here 
understood as production process in which social actors (from individuals to institutions) 
work reflexively with analytics in order to adjust their digital presence.  By ‘analytics’ here, I 
mean both the automated measurement and counting installed within the operation of digital 
platforms (and associated websites, apps and tools) and adjustments made by actors 
themselves to, or around, such measurement and counting operations. Since, quite clearly, the 
use of analytics in this sense is unavoidable in the everyday practice of all organizations 
today (except perhaps those that want to avoid a public presence and, even then, analytics of 
a sort is needed to ensure this is achieved!), we were tracking the technical mediation of an 
organizational self, the reflexive process inherent to dealing with the technological interface 
through which organizations in the digital age must present themselves to and in the world. 
We were, if you like, doing a phenomenology under digital conditions, and specifically at the 
level of organizations with social or civic ends. This insight was the birth of the project of 
social analytics (Couldry, Fotopoulou and Dickens forthcoming).  
 
Implementing such a project is however more complex than it first appears. This is because 
the process of reflecting and acting on one’s mode of ‘self-presence’ in an algorithmically-
saturated world is complex. The primary means through which remove constituencies interact 
with an organization in most cases is its website, a particular multi-part presentation of its 
organizational ‘self’. But, once conceived as an organization’s means for presenting itself 
actively and cumulatively to the world, a website becomes a complex object of reflection. It 
depends on certain ‘inputs’ (information that could be presented), certain ways of presenting 
that information (which certainly could be otherwise), and certain ways of storing and then 
further presenting the cumulative force of how those visiting the site interact with the original 
presentation. Indeed the degree to which ‘interactivity’ with the site becomes thematized and 
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made the object of active reflection is itself a key part of the translation process to be 
researched. All these levels, from the first (information inputs) to the last (the presentation of 
interactivity) involve the continuous accumulation and processing of information through 
basic counting, but also through coding (by which I mean here not initially the writing of 
computer code, but the systematic interpretation of, say, story contents or interactive events 
as belonging to a significant type or ‘code’). But which types matter to the wider story that an 
organization wants to tell about itself (more technically, what metadata it needs to tell that 
story through its website) is also a key part of the reflections that must be made explicit. So 
too are the processes of data collection and data sorting in which the organization is at any 
one time involved, or might (depending on what it is trying to do through its web presence) 
want to be involved in. The apparently simple process of developing a website through which 
an organization presents itself to the wider world becomes a window for observing a 
recursive process of reflection and action.  
 
In participating in such a process actively, sociologists need to monitor carefully the 
boundary between their practical involvement and the processes intrinsic to their own activity 
as sociologists, that is, the tracking of social actors as they act and reflect. This boundary- 
making requires an architecture of its own. In our project, it involved developing in explicit 
written form documents that gave an account of what the organization agreed it was setting 
out to do, and how it saw those aims being translated into digital form, including all the 
practical steps (such as information collection, metadata implementation, and the like), that 
such a translation involves.3 Without such documentation, we and C Media would have had 
no explicit reference-point against which to assess our collaboration, no statement of what it 
was we were jointly engaged in reflecting and acting upon. With that specified, however, our 
research team was able, in a more conventional sociological way, to track, through participant 
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observation, interviews and documentary and website analysis, the process of translating C 
Media’s digital presence into and through analytics as it was reflected upon by the actors 
involved. It is worth emphasising here that the project of social analytics does not depend on 
assuming any simple, unmediated ‘intention’ on the part of social actors: as the literature on  
the quantified self (and the social-networking-based ‘culture of connectivity’ generally: Van  
Dijck 2013) has taught us, actors living in a world saturated by practices of algorithmic 
measurement are, to some degree, already adjusting their ways of acting in the world in order 
to anticipate possible measurement, indeed to seek it as an explicit goal (Marwick 2013). 
That does not, however, as argued in relation to the original debate between Lash and Beer, 
rule out the possibility that social actors can, as in this case, develop specific aims in relation 
to the uses of analytics, which are then put into reflexive practice.    
 
None of this fieldwork would have been possible, of course, without C Media’s very active 
collaboration; since C Media was very busy making the most of its limited resources to 
achieve its immediate ends, that collaboration would, in turn, have been impossible if our 
interests and C Media’s had not converged: C Media’s aim of promoting community voice) 
fitted with the wider interests of our research project. Both our and C Media’s interests, in 
that sense, looked past analytics: for C Media to the translation of its social aims through 
analytics, and for us as sociologists to understanding how that translation got done. 
Implementing that in detail of course involved its tensions, but these were resolved over time, 
as with any project of participatory action research. One can certainly imagine now carrying 
out other projects of social analytics research in different circumstances where there was not 
the explicit convergence between the researched organizations’ aims and those of the 
research project, but only because as sociologists of culture we will have started making 




Admittedly, the involvement this project required in an organization’s practical day-to-day 
life might seem a strange topic for the sociology of culture. Some of what we did could 
appear to be a banal matter of making a website work better. But things look different when 
one realises that it is here - in how organizations gather data about their websites’ workings 
and others’ interactions with them, how they think about their websites’ metadata and its 
uses, and in their reflections on how, as organizations, they might change in response to such 
cumulative information –  it is here, in raw form, that everyday battles to make sense of a 
data-saturated world in terms of social actors’ own goals beyond just data production or 
metrics outcomes alone, are conducted. Far from compromising the tools and aims of cultural 
sociology, such empirical research is a means whereby a sociology concerned with how 
actors reflexively modify their presence in the world (for whatever wider competitive or 
practical purposes) can address the irreducibly ‘calculative’ world in which social actors such 
as civil society organizations, must today act and on which, if they want to act well, they 
must continually reflect. Any less engagement on the part of sociologists with the 
technological aspects of the ‘presentation of the self’ means not engaging with how actors 
now have presence in a digital world. If acting with and on analytics (in the extended sense in 
which I have used the term) is now part of actors’ toolkit in everyday life, then cultural 
sociologists who want to study the changing forms of everyday life must research them.  
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have considered how a sociology of culture responds to the challenge of an 
algorithmically-saturated world. This involves not quarantining off the empirical domain in 
advance through generalized ‘philosophical’ argument about what power now ‘is’ or ‘must 
work’, but rather paying close attention to the types of technologically-mediated, often 
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frustratingly constrained action in which social actors are now engaged, and on which they 
must constantly reflect.  
 
I have sketched an outline of the project of ‘social analytics’ that emerges from such an 
approach, first, by reviewing the state of the debate in the sociology of culture about the 
consequences of the deep embedding in the texture of everyday life of calculative processes 
(performed through automatic measurement based on algorithms and other uses of analytics). 
If, as William Sewell, has eloquently argued, the ‘social’ is – and always has been - both 
‘language-game’ and ‘built environment’ (2005: chapter 10), then so-called ‘algorithmic 
power’ (Lash 2007) is just the latest of the ways in which language-games get ‘hardened’ into 
the built environments for action with which actors must deal. Pursuing social analytics 
involves more possibilities than I have been able to outline here, including tracking social 
actors as they resist the imposition of analytics as the basis of management or other forms of 
organizational control, or as they use analytics to enhance broader strategies of implementing 
social change. In all such cases, including those considered in detail here, social actors can be 
tracked as they move reflexively from dealing with and reacting to mere measures of their 
being-in-the-world (‘data’ that as yet is only interpreted automatically without reference to 
wider matters of meaning to them) to treating those measures (and their automated impact on 
the operations of everyday reality) as themselves a topic for reflection and adaptive action, 
that is, a reworking of data back into meaning that, potentially, restores some element of 
meaning in an increasingly automatised and systematised world.4   
 
The task of a sociology of culture, in response, is not to further reify the outcome by 
claiming, for example, that algorithmic power leaves no space for reflexivity or resistance to 
power, but, on the contrary, as Sewell says, to contribute to the ‘de-reification of social life’ 
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(2005: 369), and so to build possibilities of social critique based in how social reality is 
constructed by powerful institutional forces (Boltanski 2012: 51, referring to Berger and 
Luckmann 1966). Translated into practical terms, this means attending, through situated 
fieldwork, to social actors as they themselves struggle to de-reify the tools with which they 
must work in order to be present in the world as they want to be. While the challenge for 
social actors of translating their broader aims through techniques of measurement and audit 
(Power 1997) is not new in itself, the opacity of how calculation is embedded in everyday life 
poses special challenges for reflexive agency. Registering that site of agency is the purpose of 
social analytics, conceived as an empirical project of cultural sociology that addresses the 
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